Published November 2, 2017
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Artificial Markets and the Theory of Games
- Creators
- Montgomery, W. David
Abstract
The theory of games has provided notable insights into the nature of bargaining processes. In this article I will apply co-operative game theory to a specific problem of air pollution control, as a device for designing and evaluating a set of institutions intended to eliminate certain transaction costs which appear to prevent profitable bargains from being consummated.
Additional Information
Revised. This article draws on material included in my doctoral dissertation, "Market Systems for the Control of Air Pollution," submitted to the Department of Economics at Harvard University. A lengthier version was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society in May 1972. I am indebted to Kenneth Arrow, Walter Isard, James Krier and Charles Plott for suggestions and criticisms, and to the Environmental Quality Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology for research support. Published as Montgomery, W. David. "Artificial markets and the theory of games." Public Choice 18.1 (1974): 25-40.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp8_-_revised.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82870
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171101-165803522
- Environmental Quality Laboratory
- Created
-
2017-11-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers, Environmental Quality Laboratory
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 8