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Published March 1977 | public
Journal Article

Bureaucratic compliance as a game on the unit square

Abstract

The most rigorous extensive theory of bureaucratic behavior yet developed is contained in William Niskanen's Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Niskanen's theory has numerous and important derivations explaining significant aspects of bureaucratic behavior, but even more importantly, it demonstrates the basic advantages of deductive methodology. By clearly and precisely stating its assumptions, Niskanen's theory invites falsification and correction in a way that can hopefully lead to a cumulative body of knowledge about bureaucratic organizations.

Additional Information

© 1977 Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The author, an assistant professor at California Institute of Technology, wishes to express his appreciation to Joe Oppenheimer and Norman Frohlieh for their helpful advice and encouragement during work on early drafts of this paper, and to William Niskanen for his thoughtful critique and suggestions.

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
October 17, 2023