Published October 27, 2017
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Candidate Preference under Uncertainty: An Expanded View of Rational Voting
- Creators
- Weisberg, Herbert F.
- Fiorina, Morris P.
Abstract
This paper examines how rational voters might choose between candidates under conditions of uncertainty. We shall emphasize two rational voting approaches--"defensive voting" and "credulous voting "--which have previously escaped notice. Additionally, we shall map out some of the implications of electoral uncertainty for empirical tests of the rational model and for the development of spatial theory. We shall not attempt to prove how citizens decide to vote, but we shall expand considerably the conventional interpretation of rational voting.
Additional Information
Published in The Electorate Reconsidered, edited by John Pierce and John Sullivan, pp. 237-256. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp138.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82713
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171026-150639896
- Created
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2017-10-27Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 138