Published October 25, 2017
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Representations of Binary Decision Rules by Generalized Decisiveness Structures
- Creators
- Ferejohn, John A.
- Fishburn, Peter C.
Abstract
This paper is motivated by two apparently dissimilar deficiencies in the theory of social choice and the theory of cooperative games. Both deficiencies stem from what we regard as an inadequate conception of decisiveness or coalitional power. Our main purpose will be to present a more general concept of decisiveness and to show that this notion allows us to characterize broad classes of games and social choice procedures.
Additional Information
Published as Ferejohn, John A., and Peter C. Fishburn. "Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures." Journal of Economic Theory 21.1 (1979): 28-45.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp168.pdf
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sswp168.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82666
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-134446210
- Created
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2017-10-25Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 168