Published October 16, 2017
| Submitted
Report
Open
A Decision-Theoretic Approach to Arms Competition
- Creators
- McCubbins, Mathew D.
Abstract
This paper develops a decision/game-theoretic model of arms growth which implies that arms competitions develop only between nations with conflicting foreign policy goals, and that, between such nations, arms races between weapons with conflicting policy missions are ubiquitous. Further implications and extensions of the model are discussed, as are possible avenues of estimation.
Additional Information
Revised. The author wishes to thank Bob Forsythe and Louie Wilde for helpful comments.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp294_-_revised.pdf
Files
sswp294_-_revised.pdf
Files
(642.5 kB)
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:9f6f399f7c5ffcb89ae9f7e44c1a879a
|
642.5 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82353
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-161314570
- Created
-
2017-10-16Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 294