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Published October 16, 2017 | Submitted
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Power Structure and Cardinality Restrictions for Paretian Social Choice Rules

Abstract

Let f be a multiple-valued Paretian social choice rule for n voters and an outcome set X. The preventing sets for f are shown to form an acyclic majority when |X| ̅n, and a filter when f also satisfies a binary independence condition. These results are then shown to yield inequalities relating |X|, n, and certain preventing sets. In particular, if every coalition of q voters constitutes a preventing set, then |X|≤[(n-1)/(n-q)]. Other n-q inequalities are obtained if strong equilibria are present for every preference profile.

Additional Information

Support from National Science Foundation Grant SOC790-7366 is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Packel, Edward W. "Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules." Social Choice and Welfare 1.2 (1984): 105-111.

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Created:
August 19, 2023
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