Published October 9, 2017
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Efficient Reliance and Contract Remedies
- Creators
- Rogerson, William P.
Abstract
Parties to a contract often must engage in expenditures prior to the performance of the contract to either prepare for or make use of the performance of the contract. Legal institutions provide for contract enforcement either by specifically enforcing contractually specified actions or by requiring that the breacher pay the breachee an amount of money called damages. This paper analyzes the impact of varying the enforcement institution on the incentives to rely. An unambiguous ranking of specific performance and five damage measures are obtained in terms of efficiency of the reliance decision.
Additional Information
I would like to thank Robert Bates, Roger Noll, Alan Schwartz, Steven Shavell, and Louis Wilde for extremely helpful comments and discussions. This paper benefited immensely from job seminars at a number of universities. It was written while I was supported by a Canada Council Doctoral Fellowship. Published in The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, #1 (Spring, 1984) pp. 39-53Attached Files
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Additional details
- Alternative title
- Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract
- Eprint ID
- 82232
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171009-151913440
- Canada Council Doctoral Fellowship
- Created
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2017-10-09Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 340