Regulation by Demand: A New Institutional Approach to the Natural Monopoly Problem
- Creators
- Kruse, Jörn
Abstract
Regulation-by-demand, a new institutional design for the natural monopoly system, is based on the demanders' participation in the industry's regulatory process. Conventional rate of return regulation fails to implement allocative efficiency and is subject to significant limitations and distortions in its information processing, which prevents the preferences from being disclosed. It is suggested that, if a utility function that encompasses quality characteristics is considered, the failures in the industry's performance are even more severe than what is usually acknowledged. Regulation-by-demand provides allocatively functional incentives for reliable information processing and for efficient performance of the industry. It has significant advantages of institutional flexibility if the industry looses its natural monopoly properties.
Additional Information
Research and publication of this paper is sponsored in part by the American Council of Learned Societies.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp342.pdf
Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82230
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171009-145308908
- American Council of Learned Societies
- Created
-
2017-10-09Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 342