Published October 6, 2017
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Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information
- Creators
- Green, Edward J.
- Porter, Robert H.
Abstract
Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joints profits. This paper studies the applicability of that work to empirical industrial organization. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.
Additional Information
Revised. Original dated to January 1981. We have accepted the generous help of many colleagues in the course of this research. We would particularly like to thank C. Berry, T. Bresnahan, S. Salop, H. Sonnenschein, and R. Willig. Robert Porter's research received support from the Canada Council and a a Sloan Foundation grant to the University of Minnesota Economics Department. Published as Green, Edward J., and Robert H. Porter. "Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1984): 87-100.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82178
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171006-135046763
- Canada Council
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- Created
-
2017-10-06Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 367