Collective Decision Mechanisms and Efficient Stock Market Allocations: Existence of a Participation Equilibrium
- Creators
- Forsythe, Robert
- Suchanek, Gerry L.
Abstract
The recent literature on economies with an incomplete set of markets has been devoted to the study of the efficiency properties of collective stockholder decision mechanisms for guiding the behavior of firms when the restrictive Ekern-Wilson spanning condition is not satisfied. The results have been essentially negative; a majority voting rule and controlling interest rules will not yield efficient equilibrium allocations in general. However, in a recent paper, Helpman and Razin (1978) suggested a decision rule that assures constrained Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocations. Their rule is patterned on the recent contributions to the theory of incentive compatibility. In this paper, we show that an equilibrium relative to the Helpman-Razin Mechanism rarely exists, making their optimality result essentially vacuous. We then demonstrate that an equilibrium does exist in general relative to the Shared Cost Mechanism developed by Hurwicz (1976), and that all equilibrium allocations in the Helpman-Razin model are constrained Pareto optima. Finally, we suggest that the optimality of equilibrium allocations is as much a consequence of how technology is modeled as of the incentives induced by the decision mechanism. Existence, on the other hand, is very sensitive in general to the decision mechanism adopted.
Additional Information
Revised. Published as Forsythe, Robert, and Gerry L. Suchanek. "Collective decision mechanisms and efficient stock market allocations: existence of a participation equilibrium." International Economic Review (1984): 21-43.Attached Files
Published - sswp371.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82142
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171005-170047641
- Created
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2017-10-06Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 371