Quasitransitive Social Choice Without the Pareto Principle
- Creators
- Williamson, John M.
Abstract
The underlying observation of this paper is that when the Pareto principle fails, the collection X of alternatives may be partitioned into a set X^* of unbeatable (against at least one member of X) elements and its complement X~X^* on which the Pareto axiom holds. It is then instructive to characterize the decisive, antidecisive and blocking coalitions for X~X^*against X~X^*, X~X^* against X^*, X^* against X~X^*, and X^* against X^*. Now X^* itself may contain elements which are unbeatable with respect to alternatives in X^*—this is to say that the Pareto axiom fails again. Thus X^* may be partitioned into 〖〖(X〗^*)〗^*=X^(2*)and X^*~X^(2*), locally on X^*, and then the same analysis that was applied in the case of the partition (X^*,X~X^*) can be employed again. This process is iterated until X^(n*) = Φ or X^(n*)=X^((n+1)*), for some n.
Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82065
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171004-132813742
- Created
-
2017-10-06Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 408