Rousseau's General Will, The Pareto Principle, and the Problem of Consent

Abstract

Most critics of Rousseau regard his account of the general will as incoherent. In this paper, this assessment is challenged. I argue that the general will is simply the sum of the decisions made by individual citizens about what is in the public interest, and it is in the public interest to be governed by a regime that is capable of making Pareto improvements in the living conditions of those it governs, that is, a regime whose policies are such that at least one citizen is better off and no citizen is worse off. This reading is supported by an examination of the procedures Rousseau recommended for conducting assemblies at which the general will is to be expressed. Further, this reading has the advantage of being psychologically plausible -- at least for the small, homogeneous societies Rousseau was discussing. Finally, on this reading the problem of consent Rousseau's chief concern -- is solved, but again only for small homogeneous societies.

Files

Additional details