Published September 19, 2017
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Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Creators
- Banks, Jeffrey S.
- Sobel, Joel
Abstract
We present a refinement of the set of sequential equilibria [Kreps & Wilson (1982)] for generic signaling games based on rationality postulates for off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. This refinement concept eliminates equilibria which Kreps (1985) and others dismiss on intuitive grounds. In addition, we derive a characterization of the set of stable equilibria [Kohlberg and Mertens (1982)] for generic signaling games in terms of equilibrium strategies and restrictions on beliefs. Examples are given which differentiate the predictions of these equilibrium concepts.
Additional Information
Revised. Original dated to March 1985. Presented at the 5th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Boston MA, August 1985. We thank participants of Caltech, UCSD and Rand Corporation Theory Workshops, Drew Fudenberg, David Kreps, and two referees for valuable comments. Sobel thanks Joe Farrell and Chris Harris for many conversations on related topic and the National Science Foundation for partial support under grant SES 84-08655. Published as Banks, Jeffrey S., and Joel Sobel. "Equilibrium selection in signaling games." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1987): 647-661.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81505
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-161826033
- SES 84-08655
- NSF
- Created
-
2017-09-19Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 656