Published September 15, 2017
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Econometric Modeling of a Stackelberg Game with an Application to Labor Force Participation
- Creators
- Bjorn, Paul A.
- Vuong, Quang H.
Abstract
Following Bjorn and Vuong (1984), a model for dummy endogenous variables is derived from a game theoretic framework where the equilibrium concept used is that of Stackelberg. A distinctive feature of our model is that it contains as a special case the usual recursive model for discrete endogenous variables [see e.g., Maddala and Lee (1976)]. A structural interpretation of this latter model can then be given in terms of a Stackelberg game in which the leader is indifferent to the follower's action. Finally, the model is applied to a study of husband/wife labor force participation.
Additional Information
This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES-8410593. We are indebted to D. Lien and D. Rivers for helpful comments, and to Boy Toy for moral support. Remaining errors are ours.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81492
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-135937957
- SES-8410593
- NSF
- Created
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2017-09-15Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 577