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Published September 15, 2017 | Submitted
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Responsibility, Liability, and Incentive Compatibility

Page, Talbot

Abstract

In this paper I ask what should be the assignment of liability for risks of toxic chemicals, and more generally. I develop a theory of liability, based on two principles. The first is responsibility as own-cost-bearing and is justified on the grounds of fairness. The second is efficiency and is justified on the grounds of welfare. These two principles provide a joint foundation to the theory of incentive compatibility, which is an important consideration in the design of liability systems.

Additional Information

I wish to thank Brian Barry, Alan Donagan, John Gillroy, Daniel Hausman, Leo llurwicz, Will Jones, Arthur Kuflik, Bart Schultz, Alan Schwartz, Alan Strudler and Steve Walt for many helpful comments. Published as Page, Talbot. "Responsibility, liability, and incentive compatibility." Ethics 97.1 (1986): 240-262.

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