Published September 15, 2017
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Liability Rules and Pretrial Settlement
- Creators
- Banks, Jeffrey S.
Abstract
The effect of different liability rules on the pretrial behavior of litigants to a civil suit is analyzed. The interaction is modeled as a game of incomplete information, where both the plaintiff and the defendant know whether or not they were negligent in actions leading to the accident. Selection criteria are used to refine the set of sequential equilibria of the game.
Additional Information
I would like to thank participants in the Caltech Theory Workshop for helpful comments and suggestions.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp608.pdf
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sswp608.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81420
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-141634119
- Created
-
2017-09-15Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 608