The Distributive Effects of the Federal Energy Tax Act

Abstract

This paper examines the distributional consequences of the tax credits implemented by the Federal Energy Tax Act of 1978. The distributional effects are of interest both for their own sake, and because they have implications for the cost-effectiveness of the credits. If rates of return to conservation are higher for individuals who consume less housing, as earlier evidence suggests, then conservation incentive programs can achieve larger benefits for a given cost if they are distributionally more progressive. We explain the amount of credit claimed by taxpayers using a tobit model, in which credits claimed are a function of variables that affect the net benefit of weatherization. We estimate the model using data from the 1979 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program conducted by the Internal Revenue Service. We find that credits claimed are significantly higher where winters are more severe, where energy prices are high or rising rapidly, and where individuals have higher incomes and spend more on housing. Progressivity indices based on Lorenz-Gini measures of inequality reveal that the tax credits were somewhat regressive, even holding climate and energy prices constant. This suggests that the credits may have been ineffectively targeted. In addition, we find no evidence that the credits had a measurable incentive effect, suggesting that they have largely provided windfall gains to households who would have insulated anyway.

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