Published September 5, 2017
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Equilibria Resistant to Mutation
- Creators
- Boylan, Richard T.
Abstract
The paper requires that equilibrium behavior for two person symmetric games be resistant to genetic evolution. In particular the paper assumes that the evolution of genotypes selecting a behavioral rule can be described according to some generalization of the replicator model. This paper defines an equilibrium concept, 'evolutionary equilibrium', which is defined as the limit of stationary points of the evolutionary process as the proportion of the population that mutates goes to zero. Then the set of evolutionary equilibria, as defined in the paper, is a nonempty subset of the set of perfect equilibria (and thus of the set of Nash equilibria) and a superset of the set of regular equilibria and the set of ESS.
Additional Information
The author thanks Richard McKelvey for helpful comments and many enlightening discussions. Comments by Kim Border and George Mailath on earlier drafts were also helpful. Financial support provided by the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Fellowship and the Alfred P. Sloan Dissertation Fellowship is duly appreciated.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81081
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170901-133545488
- John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- Created
-
2017-09-05Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 729