Allocating Priority with Auctions: An Experimental Analysis
- Creators
- Noussair, Charles N.
- Porter, David
Abstract
There are many examples of markets where resources that were allocated ex-ante must be rationed ex-post. Two alternative methods of rationing are considered in this paper: priority service (see Chao and Wilson [1987] and Wilson [1989]) and proportional rationing (see Spulber [1989]). An experimental environment is developed in which the two rules are implemented within two well known institutions, the English and the Uniform Price sealed bid Auctions, under two different information conditions. We find that priority service generates more efficient allocations than proportional rationing, the sealed bid auction performed better than the English and that that both mechanisms and rationing rules were more efficient when there was a lack of common information.
Additional Information
We would like to thank Daniel Spulber and participants at the Economic Science Association meetings in 1989 for their helpful suggestions. We would especially like to thank John Ledyard for many valuable comments. Published as Noussair, Charles, and David Porter. "Allocating priority with auctions: an experimental analysis." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 19, no. 2 (1992): 169-195.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp747.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81044
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-150636801
- Created
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2017-08-31Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 747