Published July 2001
| public
Journal Article
Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments
- Creators
- Pápai, Szilvia
Abstract
We consider the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects without using monetary transfers. Each agent may be assigned more than one object. We show that an allocation rule is strategyproof, nonbossy, and satisfies citizen sovereignty if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. In a sequential dictatorship agents are assigned their favorite objects that are still available, according to a sequentially endogenously determined hierarchy of the agents. We also establish that replacing nonbossiness by a stronger criterion restricts the characterized class of allocation rules to serial dictatorships, in which the hierarchy of the agents is fixed a priori.
Additional Information
© 2001 Blackwell Publishers, Inc. Received November 1998; Accepted April 2000. I thank Kim Border, Tom Palfrey, Simon Wilkie, and especially John Ledyard for helpful comments. Support from a Sloan Dissertation Fellowship is gratefully acknowledged.Additional details
- Alternative title
- Strategyproof and Nonbossy Assignments
- Eprint ID
- 80948
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-084355622
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- Created
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2017-08-30Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field