Published August 30, 2017
| Submitted
Report
Open
An Experimental Analysis of Two-Person Reciprocity Games
- Creators
- Prisbrey, Jeffrey E.
Abstract
This paper presents experimental evidence concerned with behavior in one-shot, finite repetition, and infinite repetition, two-person Reciprocity Games. Both symmetric and asymmetric games as well as games with explicit punishment actions are studied and compared. Along with classifying the group outcomes to the games, individual strategies are classified. The importance of alternation or turn-taking, group welfare, and equality as focal solutions is examined. Also considered is whether or not outcomes are unique, Pareto Optimal, or individually rational, and whether or not finite repetition treatments are subject to end-game effects.
Additional Information
This paper has benefited from the comments of Charles Plott, Roy Gardner, Howard Rosenthal and especially Thomas Palfrey. I would also like to thank the participants at the Economic Science Association '91 Fall Meetings and the faculty of the California Institute of Technology, both of whom commented on an early draft. The financial support of the California Institute of Technology and the Haynes Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp787.pdf
Files
sswp787.pdf
Files
(1.0 MB)
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:a2a1e842dacb6f64a2f004e4b790bd74
|
1.0 MB | Preview Download |
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 80939
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-162254700
- Caltech
- John Randolph and Dora Haynes Foundation
- Created
-
2017-08-30Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 787