Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published February 1997 | public
Journal Article

On Incentives and Updating in Agent Based Models

Page, Scott E.

Abstract

This paper introduces the concept of incentive based asynchronous updating in which the order of updating is determined by incentives. Previously, asynchronous updating has been shown to yield greater stability than synchromous updating for a variety of dynamical systems. However, in those models the order of updating is random. When incentives determine the ordering, the dynamics and end states change. For a conformity model on a two dimensional cellular automata, incentive based asynchronous updating yields greater linear disparity. Fot the game of life, it results in much greater sensitivity to initial conditions.

Additional Information

© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Accepted 21 February 1996. Bob Axelrod, Jenna Bednar, Ann Bell, Thad Brown, Colin Camerer, Bernardo Huberman, Mike McBurnett and students in a computational economics class at UCLA helped to refine the ideas put forth in this paper.

Additional details

Created:
August 22, 2023
Modified:
October 17, 2023