Functional Voting Operators: The Non-Monotonic Case
- Creators
- Aleskerov, Fuad
- Duggan, John
Abstract
We extend the non-binary framework of social choice introduced by Aizerman and Aleskerov (1986) , in which individual choice functions are aggregated into a social choice function, by considering non-monotonic operators. We characterize the class of "local" operators and provide the explicit forms of local operators satisfying various combinations of normative and rationality conditions in the absence of monotonicity. Surprisingly, the restriction of monotonicity is not binding for operators satisfying the usual rationality conditions. We identify two rationality restrictions which do admit non-monotonic operators. One restriction admits every sovereign and neutral operator, and the other admits only dictatorship and anti-dictatorship operators. This last result is a direct non-binary counterpart to Wilson's (1972) theorem.
Additional Information
This paper was written during the first author's visit to the Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences at the California Institute of Technology. Partial financial support was received from the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. Published as Aleskerov, Fuad, and John Duggan. "Functional voting operators: the non-monotonic case." Mathematical Social Sciences 26, no. 2 (1993): 175-201.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp858.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 80752
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-163016725
- Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science
- Created
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2017-08-30Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 858