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Published August 18, 2017 | Submitted
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Strategyproof and Nonbossy Assignments

Papai, Szilvia

Abstract

We consider the assignment of heterogeneous and indivisible objects to agents without using monetary transfers, where each agent may be assigned more than one object, and the valuation of the objects to an agent may depend on what other objects the agent is assigned. The set of strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal social choice functions is characterized as dictatorial sequential choice functions. Thus, the consequences of a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type result can only be escaped in this context by using bossy social choice functions. It is also established that all strategyproof, strongly nonbossy and Pareto-optimal social choice functions are serial dictatorships, where strong nonbossiness is a stricter version of bossiness.

Additional Information

I thank Kim C. Border, John O. Ledyard, Thomas R. Palfrey, and Simon Wilkie for helpful comments. Support from the Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Pápai, Szilvia. "Strategyproof and nonbossy multiple assignments." Journal of Public Economic Theory 3, no. 3 (2001): 257-271.

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