Electoral Competition with Entry
- Creators
- Callander, Steven
Abstract
By extending the established theoretical models of electoral competition with entry (eg. Palfrey (1984)) to incorporate simultaneous competition for multiple districts I produce a unique two party equilibrium under plurality rule with non-centrist party platforms. This equilibrium also precludes entry of additional parties. This result is used to provide a domain for which Duverger's Law could be expected to apply. I also present new results under the run-o_ rule for both the single district and multiple district frameworks. In the single district case I find that for the run-off rule the model is more consistent with empirical observation than it is for the plurality rule, but that this performance is reversed when we consider multiple districts. The paper also sheds some light on how the different levels of elections in the U.S. and other systems relate to each other.
Additional Information
The financial support of the Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences at Caltech is gratefully acknowledged. I would like to thank Jeff Banks for advice and guidance, and Garret Glasgow, Richard McKelvey, and Catherine Wilson for helpful comments.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1083.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79980
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-161419643
- Caltech Division of Humanities and Social Sciences
- Created
-
2017-08-09Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1083