A Note On Impossibility Theorems and Seniority Rules
- Creators
- Hild, Matthias
Abstract
We characterize seniority rules, also known as lexical dictatorships, under weak consistency constraints on the group's choice function. These constraints are base triple-acyclicity in the case of binary choices and rationalizability (although not rationality) in the case of choices between an arbitrary number of alternatives. Existing results on these weakened constraints remain silent on the treatment of the group's most junior individuals and therefore do not yield a complete characterization of seniority rules. We also impose a universal domain, binary strict Pareto optimality, binary Pareto indifference, binary independence of irrelevant alternatives, and the newly introduced condition of conflict resolution. The latter condition requires a social choice rules not to remain indecisive between alternatives for which individuals have conflicting preferences.
Additional Information
© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers.Errata
This revised version was published online in May 2005 with a corrected article title.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79911
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-085027892
- Created
-
2017-08-08Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field