Published August 2, 2017
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A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency
- Creators
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Jackson, Matthew O.
Abstract
I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links.
Additional Information
This was written for the volume Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions, edited by Gabrielle Demange and Myrna Wooders, which was published in 2005 by Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. I thank Jernej Copic, Sanjeev Goyal, and Anne van den Nouweland for comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from the Lee Center for Advanced Networking is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Jackson, M.O. (2005). A survey of network formation models: stability and efficiency. Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions, 11-49.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79700
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-140704727
- Caltech Lee Center for Advanced Networking
- Created
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2017-08-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1161