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Published August 1, 2017 | Submitted
Report Open

Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes

Abstract

We model and compare three different processes by which political parties nominate candidates for a general election: nominations by party leaders, nominations by a vote of party members, and nominations by a spending competition among potential candidates. We show that in equilibrium, non-median outcomes can result when two parties compete using nominations via any of these processes. We also show that more extreme outcomes can emerge from spending competition than from nominations by votes or by party leaders. When voters (and potential nominees) are free to switch political parties, then median outcomes ensue when nominations are decided by a vote but not when nominations are decided by spending competition.

Additional Information

This paper began as part of a class project, and we thank Jon Eguia and Heidi Kamp for their valuable input and insights at early stages of the project. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Sciences, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the National Science Foundation under grant SES-0316493.

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Created:
August 19, 2023
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January 13, 2024