Published August 1, 2017
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Learning Dynamics in Mechanism Design: An Experimental Comparison of Public Goods Mechanisms
- Creators
- Healy, Paul J.
Abstract
In a repeated-interaction public goods economy, dynamic behavior may affect the efficiency of various mechanisms thought to be efficient in one-shot games. Inspired by results obtained in previous experiments, the current paper proposes a simple best response model in which players' beliefs are functions of previous strategy profiles. The predictions of the model are found to be highly consistent with new experimental data from five mechanisms with various types of equilibria. Interesting properties of a 2-parameter Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism help to draw out this result. The simplicity of the model makes it useful in predicting dynamic stability of other mechanisms.
Additional Information
The author wishes to thank John Ledyard for financial support, advice, and encouragement in writing this paper, as well as Ken Binmore, Matt Jackson, Tim Cason, Bob Sherman, Ivana Komunjer, Peter Bossaerts, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, and David Grether for their valuable suggestions and comments. Published as Healy, P.J. (2006). Learning dynamics for mechanism design: An experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, 129(1), 114-149.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79635
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-161011632
- Created
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2017-08-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1182