Published August 1, 2017
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Fairness, or Just Gambling on It? An Experimental Analysis of the Gift Exchange Game
- Creators
- Healy, Paul J.
Abstract
Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl experimentally test a labor market in which worker effort levels are chosen after wages are set. They observe high wages and effort levels in the repeated game, contrary to the equilibrium prediction. In a similar experimental test of lemons markets, Lynch Miller, Plott and Porter find support for the equilibrium prediction. The current paper finds more evidence of repeated game effects than in previous studies. In a model of incomplete information regarding the reciprocal nature of other players, the FKR design is shown to be conducive to reputation effects while the LMPP design is not.
Additional Information
The author wishes to thank Charlie Plott and the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science at Caltech for financial and intellectual support. Jon Eguia, Isa Hafalir, Brian Rogers, Ming Hsu, Basit Kahn, and John Ledyard all provided useful assistance and commentary.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79634
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-155937511
- Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science
- Created
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2017-08-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1183