Published August 1, 2017
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Preference Aggregation under Uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto
- Creators
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Chambers, Christopher P.
- Hayashi, Takashi
Abstract
Following Mongin, we study social aggregation of subjective expected utility preferences in a Savage framework. We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto indifference and conforming to the state-dependent expected utility model is provided.
Additional Information
We would like to thank Philippe Mongin and John Weymark for many very helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank Larry Epstein and William Thomson, for many helpful discussions. All errors are our own. Published as Chambers, C.P., & Hayashi, T. (2006). Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(2), 430-440.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79632
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-155251093
- Created
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2017-08-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2020-03-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1184