Published August 1, 2017
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Sequential Entry in Many-to-one Matching Markets
- Creators
- Boyle, Elette
-
Echenique, Federico
Abstract
We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the market will receive his or her best partner in a stable matching, extending the results of Blum and Rothblum (2002) and Cechlárová (2002) for the marriage model. We also discuss the relation between sequential bargaining and a possible alternative formulation based on the NTU Shapley value.
Additional Information
We thank Peter Biró and Utku Ünver for their advice on the related literature. Published as Boyle, E., & Echenique, F. (2009). Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets. Social Choice and Welfare, 33(1), 87-99.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79571
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-162757118
- Created
-
2017-08-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1269