Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees
- Creators
- Iaryczower, Matias
Abstract
We consider strategic voting with incomplete information and partially common values in sequential committees. A proposal is considered against the status quo in one committee, and only upon its approval advances for consideration in a second committee. Committee members (i) are privately and imperfectly informed about an unobservable state of nature which is relevant to their payoffs, and (ii) have a publicly observable bias with which they evaluate information. We show that the tally of votes in the originating committee can aggregate and transmit relevant information for members of the second committee in equilibrium, provide conditions for the composition and size of committees under which this occurs, and characterize all three classes of voting equilibria with relevant informative voting.
Additional Information
I am thankful to to Juliana Bambaci, Randy Calvert, Federico Echenique, Navin Kartik, Santiago Oliveros, and participants at the MPSA annual conference for comments to earlier versions of this paper. All errors remain my own.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1275.pdf
Files
Name | Size | Download all |
---|---|---|
md5:64398c9e13332d65d10a34ed2b3065e7
|
393.6 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79562
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-153442527
- Created
-
2017-08-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1275