On the Nature of Competition in Alternative Electoral Systems

Creators: Iaryczower, Matias; Mattozzi, Andrea

Abstract

In this paper we argue that the number of candidates running for public office, their ideological differentiation, and the intensity of campaign competition are all naturally intertwined, and jointly determined in response to the incentives provided by the electoral system. We propose a simple general equilibrium model that integrates these elements in a unitary framework, and provide a comparison between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems.

Additional Information

Second revised edition. 1st Revised: July 2008. Original: March 2008. An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title "Ideology and Competence in Alternative Electoral Systems". We thank Juan Carrillo, Federico Echenique, Zucchero Fornaciari, Daniela Iorio, Alessandro Lizzeri, Matthias Messner, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and seminar participants at Bocconi, Caltech, Northwestern, Princeton, USC, the PIER Political Economy Conference, the Workshop on the Political Economy of Democracy, the MPSA annual meeting, and the North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society for helpful comments to previous versions of this paper. Mattozzi acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation, SES-0617901. Published as Iaryczower, M., & Mattozzi, A. (2013). On the nature of competition in alternative electoral systems. The Journal of Politics, 75(3), 743-756.

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