Network Architecture, Salience and Coordination

Creators: Choi, Syngjoo; Gale, Douglas; Kariv, Shachar; Palfrey, Thomas R.

Abstract

This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation of monotone games with imperfect information. Players are located at the nodes of a network and observe the actions of other players only if they are connected by the network. These games have many sequential equilibria; nonetheless, the behavior of subjects in the laboratory is predictable. The network architecture makes some strategies salient and this in turn makes the subjects' behavior predictable and facilitates coordination on efficient outcomes. In some cases, modal behavior corresponds to equilibrium strategies.

Additional Information

Revised version. Original: July 2008. This research was supported by the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS) and the UC Berkeley Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab). The paper has benefited from suggestions by the participants of seminars at several universities. We acknowledge The National Science Foundation for support under grants SBR-0095109 (Gale), SES-0617955 (Gale and Kariv), and SES-0617820 (Palfrey) and The Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (Palfrey). Kariv is grateful for the hospitality of the School of Social Science in the Institute for Advanced Studies. Published as Choi, Syngjoo and Gale, Douglas and Kariv, Shachar and Palfrey, Thomas. (2011) Network architecture, salience and coordination. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(1):76-90.

Attached Files

Submitted - sswp1291_-_revised.pdf

Files

sswp1291_-_revised.pdf

Files (379.9 kB)

Name	Size	Download all
sswp1291_-_revised.pdf md5:9883e600d08bc214105e1b9358620245	379.9 kB	Preview Download

Additional details

	All versions	This version
Views	0	0
Downloads	0	0
Data volume	0 Bytes	0 Bytes