Market Design for Fishery IFQ Programs
- Creators
- Ledyard, John O.
Abstract
I examine the impact of market design on the performance of a cap-and-trade program for Individual Fishing Quotas. In equilibrium, neither the term of the quota, the number of years for which it is valid, nor the method of initial allocation, granting or selling, has a differential effect on the protability of the shery or the quality of the environment. However, the term of the quota and the method of initialization can have a big impact on the price discovery process and whether equilibrium is attained. Because of this, both the fishery and the environment can be significantly better off with a mixture of historically based grants and auctions with some form of limited term quotas. I also discuss some additional benefits from an initialization process that generates some revenue for the public. Section 5 contains a summary.
Additional Information
This paper was prepared with the financial support of the Natural Resources Defense Council and Ecotrust. Ed Backus Karen Garrison, and Astrid Scholz provided valuable intellectual assistance. They are, of course, not responsible for any of the content.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1301.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79505
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-150205866
- National Resources Defense Council
- Ecotrust
- Created
-
2017-08-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1301