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Published June 2009 | Submitted
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Designing Experiments with Computational Testbeds: Effects of Convergence Speed in Coordination Games

Abstract

Using a computational testbed, we theoretically predict and experimentally show that in the minimum effort coordination game, as the cost of effort increases, 1) the game converges to lower effort levels, 2) the convergence speed increases, and 3) the average payoff is not monotonically decreasing. In fact, the average profit is an U-shaped curve as a function of cost. Therefore, contrary to the intuition, one can obtain a higher average profit by increasing the cost of effort.

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Created:
August 20, 2023
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January 13, 2024