Published August 2, 2017
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Cooperation Without Immediate Reciprocity: An Experiment in Favor Exchange
- Creators
- Roy, Nilanjan
Abstract
This paper presents experimental evidence concerned with behavior in indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games. Subjects interact in pairs in continuous time and occasionally one of them receives opportunity to provide a favor to her partner. The effects of changing the benefit of receiving a favor and the arrival rate of opportunities to do a favor are studied when the opportunities are privately observed. Also considered are the impacts of informational access to partner's opportunities on efficiency and the overall behavior of individuals with respect to "obvious" state variables.
Additional Information
I am grateful to Thomas Palfrey for excellent guidance and generous support for running the experiments. The funding from Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. I am also thankful to Chris Crabbe for developing the experimental software. Federico Echenique, Ben Gillen, Julian Romero and Matthew Shum provided helpful suggestions.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1358.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79486
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-102025513
- Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation
- Created
-
2017-08-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1358