Published August 7, 2017
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Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games
Abstract
We analyze a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have differing relative intensities (i.e. the game is non-zero sum). We characterize the colonels' payoffs that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a pure strategy equilibria is non-empty.
Additional Information
We thank Antonio Cabrales and Antoni Rubi for helpful comments.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1335.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79441
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-144614816
- Created
-
2017-08-07Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1335