An Experimental Comparison Between Free Negotiation and a Multi-issue Point Mechanism
Abstract
We propose a multi-issue point mechanism to be used in conflict resolution situations. This mechanism extract "gains from trade" inherent in the differing valuation towards the various issues where conflict exists. In order to assess the performance of this mechanism vis-a-vis unconstrained communication, we run a series of controlled laboratory experiments and find that both mechanisms reach similar levels of welfare, but the multi issue point mechanism allows subjects to reach an agreement more swiftly. In order to analyse in detail the performance of both mechanisms we introduce a classical measure of conflict and see that when conflict is highest, free negotiation sustains most losses: (1) subjects need more time to reach an agreement; (2) the likelihood of gridlock (no agreement) increases.
Additional Information
We thank Ido Erev, Robin Hogarth, Nagore Iriberri and seminar participants at a number of conferences for helpful comments and discussions. We acknowledge financial support from the British Academy.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1336.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79434
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-142302581
- British Academy
- Created
-
2017-08-07Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1336