Published May 2017
| Accepted Version
Journal Article
Open
Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security
Abstract
Fu et al. (2016) introduced a stability concept for labor markets with job security. We show that their proposed outcomes form Nash equilibria of an auction where firms compete for workers. This parallels literature on stable outcomes and similar auctions, and yields new price of anarchy bounds.
Additional Information
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. Received 29 October 2016. Received in revised form 6 February 2017. Accepted 17 February 2017. Available online 20 February 2017. The third author's research was supported by a Marie-Curie IOF fellowship grant ADVANCE-AGT 330240. Smorodinsky gratefully acknowledges the support of ISF grant 2016301, the joint Microsoft-Technion e-Commerce Lab, Technion VPR grants, the Bernard M. Gordon Center for Systems Engineering at the Technion and the Technion Autonomous System Program at the Technion.Attached Files
Accepted Version - SPIB-V4.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 77551
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170518-080939719
- ADVANCE-AGT 330240
- Marie Curie Fellowship
- 2016301
- Israel Science Foundation
- Microsoft-Technion e-Commerce Lab
- Technion
- Created
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2017-05-18Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field