Published January 2017
| Accepted Version
Journal Article
Open
Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
- Creators
-
Echenique, Federico
- Galichon, Alfred
Abstract
We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade stable matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade stable matching is one in which the availability of transfers does not affect the outcome.
Additional Information
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. Received 1 May 2014, Available online 21 October 2015. The authors wish to thank Juan Pereyra Barreiro and Aditya Kuvalekar for many useful suggestions, and for pointing out a mistake in one of the examples in a previous version of the paper. 2This research has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013)/ ERC grant agreement no 313699.Attached Files
Accepted Version - 2102.04337.pdf
Files
2102.04337.pdf
Files
(638.0 kB)
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:49d4797e612ea82b2a08879713f8e24c
|
638.0 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 76619
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.002
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170417-152127453
- 313699
- European Research Council (ERC)
- Created
-
2017-04-18Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field