Published May 2008
| Submitted
Journal Article
Open
Proper scoring rules for general decision models
- Creators
- Chambers, Christopher P.
Abstract
If a decision maker whose behavior conforms to the max-min expected utility model is faced with a scoring rule for a subjective expected utility decision maker, she will always announce a probability belonging to her set of priors; moreover, for any prior in the set, there is a scoring rule inducing the agent to announce that prior. We also show that on the domain of Choquet expected utility preferences with risk neutral lottery evaluation and totally monotone capacities, proper scoring rules do not exist. This implies the non-existence of proper scoring rules for any larger class of preferences (CEU with convex capacities, multiple priors).
Additional Information
© 2007 Elsevier. Received 19 December 2005, Available online 26 September 2007.Attached Files
Submitted - F12191.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 75926
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170408-142034326
- Created
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2017-04-20Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field