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Published October 2016 | Submitted
Journal Article Open

Get out the (costly) vote: institutional design for greater participation

Abstract

We examine two commonly discussed institutions inducing turnout: abstention penalties (used in 32 countries) and lotteries rewarding one randomly chosen participant (as proposed on the 2006 Arizona ballot). We analyze a benchmark model in which voters vary in their information quality and participation is costly. We illustrate that both institutions can improve collective outcomes, though lotteries are a more effective instrument asymptotically. Experimentally, we provide strong evidence for selective participation: lab voters participate more when better informed or when institutionally induced. Lotteries fare better than fines, suggesting that they may be a useful alternative to commonly used compulsory voting schemes.

Additional Information

© 2016 Western Economic Association International. Issue online: 30 August 2016; Version of record online: 20 March 2016; Manuscript Accepted: 5 August 2015; Manuscript Received: 11 May 2015. We are thankful to Tim Feddersen and Navin Kartik for very useful comments. Yariv gratefully acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation (SES 0551014).

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Created:
August 20, 2023
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