Published June 2018
| Accepted Version
Book Section - Chapter
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Social Learning Equilibria
Abstract
We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, observe private signals, share the same utility function, and act in a general dynamic setting. We introduce Social Learning Equilibria, a static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details of the given dynamics, but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic equilibrium behavior. We establish strong equilibrium properties on agreement, herding, and information aggregation.
Additional Information
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Elchanan Mossel is supported by awards NSF DMS-1737944, ONR N00014-17-1-2598, and CCF 1665252. Manuel Mueller-Frank gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Ref. ECO2015-63711-P). Omer Tamuz is supported by a grant from the Simons Foundation (#419427).Attached Files
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Additional details
- Alternative title
- On Agreement and Learning
- Eprint ID
- 71939
- DOI
- 10.1145/3219166.3219207
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20161111-104138106
- DMS-1737944
- NSF
- N00014-17-1-2598
- Office of Naval Research (ONR)
- CCF-1665252
- NSF
- ECO2015-63711-P
- Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (MINECO)
- 419427
- Simons Foundation
- Created
-
2016-11-16Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-11Created from EPrint's last_modified field