Expressive and Strategic Behavior in Legislative Elections in Argentina
- Creators
- Núñez, Lucas
Abstract
In this paper I study strategic voting behavior in the Argentine Senate election for the City of Buenos Aires in 2013. I estimate and analyze the voter transition matrix between the primary and general elections using a Bayesian hierarchical model for ecological inference, utilizing a rich data set of ballot box data. The results show that strategic behavior is not widespread among the electorate in Buenos Aires. In particular, at least 75 % of voters who had the opportunity to avoid vote wasting by behaving strategically did not. I also find high levels of vote wasting when analyzing other provinces during the same election cycle. These results suggest that these electorates might be composed of a mixture of voters with strategic and expressive motivations, where the expressive factions dominate.
Additional Information
© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media New York. First Online: 21 April 2016.Attached Files
Supplemental Material - 11109_2016_9340_MOESM1_ESM.pdf
Files
Name | Size | Download all |
---|---|---|
md5:3fa7c351f7ac3fa68b9daccdd9aacc3a
|
164.7 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 71868
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20161109-084022061
- Created
-
2016-11-09Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-11Created from EPrint's last_modified field