Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: Theory and experiment
- Creators
- Castillo, Marco
- Dianat, Ahrash
Abstract
We investigate strategic behavior in a centralized matching clearinghouse based on the Gale–Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm. To do so, we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the degree to which agents strategically misrepresent their preferences by submitting a "truncation" of their true preferences. Our experimental design uses a restricted environment in which a particular form of truncation is always a best response. We find that subjects do not truncate their preferences more often when truncation is profitable. They do, however, truncate their preferences less often when truncation is dangerous – that is, when there is a risk of "over-truncating" and remaining unmatched. Our findings suggest that behavioral insights can play an important role in the field of market design.
Additional Information
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. Received 26 April 2015, Available online 23 June 2016.Attached Files
Submitted - truncation_finalgeb.pdf
Supplemental Material - mmc1.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 70687
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160930-094706500
- Created
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2016-09-30Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-11Created from EPrint's last_modified field