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Published July 2016 | Submitted + Supplemental Material
Journal Article Open

Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: Theory and experiment

Abstract

We investigate strategic behavior in a centralized matching clearinghouse based on the Gale–Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm. To do so, we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the degree to which agents strategically misrepresent their preferences by submitting a "truncation" of their true preferences. Our experimental design uses a restricted environment in which a particular form of truncation is always a best response. We find that subjects do not truncate their preferences more often when truncation is profitable. They do, however, truncate their preferences less often when truncation is dangerous – that is, when there is a risk of "over-truncating" and remaining unmatched. Our findings suggest that behavioral insights can play an important role in the field of market design.

Additional Information

© 2016 Elsevier Inc. Received 26 April 2015, Available online 23 June 2016.

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Submitted - truncation_finalgeb.pdf

Supplemental Material - mmc1.pdf

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August 20, 2023
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