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Published May 2004 | Published
Book Section - Chapter Open

Experimental Study of Market Reputation Mechanisms

Abstract

We experimentally compare low-information, high-information and self-reporting reputation mechanisms. The results indicate players strategically reacted to the reputation mechanisms, with higher information mechanisms increasing market efficiency.

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