Published June 2010
| public
Book Section - Chapter
Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects
Abstract
The Combinatorial Public Projects Problem (CPPP) is an abstraction of resource allocation problems in which agents have preferences over alternatives, and an outcome that is to be collectively shared by the agents is chosen so as to maximize the social welfare. We explore CPPP from both computational and mechanism design perspectives. We examine CPPP in the hierarchy of complement-free (subadditive) valuation classes and present positive and negative results for both unrestricted and truthful algorithms.
Additional Information
© 2010 ACM. [DB] Supported by NSF CCF-0346991, CCF-0830787 and BSF 2004329. [MS] Supported by NSF grant 0331548. [YS] Supported by the Microsoft Research fellowship.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 69589
- DOI
- 10.1145/1807342.1807348
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160812-110434756
- CCF-0346991
- NSF
- CCF-0830787
- NSF
- 2004329
- Binational Science Foundation (USA-Israel)
- Microsoft Research
- Created
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2016-08-12Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-11Created from EPrint's last_modified field