Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published June 2010 | public
Book Section - Chapter

Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects

Abstract

The Combinatorial Public Projects Problem (CPPP) is an abstraction of resource allocation problems in which agents have preferences over alternatives, and an outcome that is to be collectively shared by the agents is chosen so as to maximize the social welfare. We explore CPPP from both computational and mechanism design perspectives. We examine CPPP in the hierarchy of complement-free (subadditive) valuation classes and present positive and negative results for both unrestricted and truthful algorithms.

Additional Information

© 2010 ACM. [DB] Supported by NSF CCF-0346991, CCF-0830787 and BSF 2004329. [MS] Supported by NSF grant 0331548. [YS] Supported by the Microsoft Research fellowship.

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
October 20, 2023