Published March 1988
| public
Journal Article
Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
- Creators
- Banks, J. S.
- Bordes, G. A.
Abstract
We present four choice functions which characterize the stationary points of sequential search rules derived from a preference relation over outcomes. These functions are contrasted with others in the literature in terms of narrowness of choice as well as their ability to satisfy certain normative and consistency conditions, and it is shown how two of these sets arise as the set of equilibrium outcomes of a voting game under different tie-breaking assumptions.
Additional Information
© 1988 Springer-Verlag. March 1988. We would like to thank Nicholas Miller for introducing us and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 67344
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-101449328
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2016-05-26Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-11Created from EPrint's last_modified field